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CoMnm2AS
Obscenity cannot be measured as a crime, but only a sin. Likewise
a sin is a very subjective standard and not amenable to legal sanction.56
The utter ridiculousness of obscenity legislation was summed up as
follows:
Additionally, censorship spawns its own particular evils: timidity;
cynicism; unwarranted curiosity. It stiffles expression that may be
therapeutic. Furthermore, it is self-defeating. The 'big business of
pornography' thrives on the very laws that impede its supply and
increase the demand. Experience has shown that the word 'censored'
is more profitable to the pornographer than the content of his material.
There is no rational regulation for an irrational phenomenon. The
best regulation is self-regulation. The applause or rejection of the audi-
ence will always be the ultimate censor, no matter what the state of the
law. The great courage of the Supreme Court has faltered in the ob-
scenity cases, save for the clear and thoroughly adult opinions of Justices
Douglas and Black. Both Justices have emphasized that the choice of
what to read is an individual and not a governmental choice. The choice
is admittedly difficult but unavoidably personal and it is high-time that
we stop imprisoning men for selling books, and lift the distasteful task
of the censor from the Court, and from government, and make our
own decisions as to what we are to read, to see, and to think.57
One should be free to choose his own reading material. Questions
should not concern the nature of the material, but why some people
read only pornography. One should be permitted to live his adult life
with all its risks, including those involving sexuality and obscenity.
The legislature should refrain from removing by law the natural right
of presumptively rational adults to accept these risks and choose for
themselves what they desire to read. The point was best summarized
three hundred years ago by John Milton in his Areopagitica. Here
he enunciated the eternal case against censorship: "For those actions
which enter into a man rather than issue out of him, Cod uses not to
captivate under a general prescription, but trusts him with the gift of
reason to be his own chooser."58 (Emphasis added.)
Thomas B. Russell
ClUm-TAL LAw-CoNsENSUAL HomosexuAL BEHAvioR-Tim NED
FoR LEGISLA=vE i EFon.-One has only to explore the pages of Ken-
tucky legal history to find that before 1962 the statutory prohibition
against sodomy was one of the untouched areas of Kentucky criminal
law. The Penal Act of 1778 prescribed a two to five year penalty for
56 Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM.
L. Rtv. 691 (1963).
57 Note, supra note 54, at 132.
Us Gilman, supra note 5, at 82.
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the undefined crime of sodomy.' Our present statute, Section 486.050
of the Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter referred to as KRS],
also fails to define sodomy while continuing to impose a similar two
to five year penalty for the act.2 If one were to look to the Kentucky
Court of Appeals for interpretative guidance as to the statutory
meaning of sodomy, one would only find decisions clothed in the
clouded euphemistic terminology of Nineteenth century English
common law. This, however, is not surprising since the Court has not
had an opportunity to examine the crime of sodomy since the 1909
case of Commonwealth v. Poindexter.3 Here the Court based its
decision on English common law and failed to mention the governing
Kentucky statute.
4
In 1962 another regulation of sexual conduct was enacted, KRS §
485.105,5 to prohibit indecent or immoral practices with another. It is
divided into two sections. The first pertains to such practices between
a person seventeen years old or over and a person under the age of
fifteen. It has been interpreted by the Court of Appeals on numerous
occasions, and yet the Court has never been confronted with the crime
of sodomy, whether that sodomy be heterosexual, homosexual or
bestial in nature.6 The second section, pertaining to indecent or im-
12 THE STATUTE LAW OF KENrTucc 12 (W. Littell ed. 1810).2 KRS § 360.050 (1942) states: "Any person who commits sodomy or bug-
gery, with man or beast, shall be confined in the penitentiary for not less than two
nor more than five years."
3 133 Ky. 720, 118 S.W. 943 (1909).
4 Id. The Court held sodomy to be a crime consisting of carnal copulation
by human beings against nature, with penetration. Penetration of the mouth is
not sufficient to constitute the crime. Consent makes the consenting partner an
accomplice to the crime. Buggery is the same offense between a man and a beast
It should be noted that the Court deleted or disregarded the common law
requirement that sodomy, in order to be indictable, must be open, notorious,
grossly scandalous and public. 4 BcAsoNE CominwTr~Es 85 (Hammond ed.
1890).
5 KRS § 435.105 (1962) states:
(1) Any person of the age of seventeen years or over who carnally
abuses the body, or indulges in any indecent or immoral practices with
the body or organs of any child under the age of fifteen years, or who
induces, procures or permits a child under the age of fifteen years to
indulge in immoral, sexual or indecent practices with himself or any per-
son shall be guilty of a felony, punishable on conviction thereof by im-
prisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than
two years.
2) Any person of the age of seventeen years or over who carnally abuses
e body, or indulges in any indecent or immoral practices with the body
or organs of any other person of the age of fifteen or over or who in-
duces, procures or permits any person of the age of fifteen years or older
to indulge in immoral, sexual or indecent practices with himself or any
other person, not otherwise denounced in this chapter, shall be guilty
of a felony, punishable on conviction thereof by an imprisonment in the
penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.
6A deviate connection with a fowl is not sodomy at common law. I RussELT,
CiRums 736 (12th ed. 1964).
[Vol. 57,
COoi, Nrs
moral practices between a person seventeen years old or over and a
person over fifteen, has never been interpreted in any manner by the
Court of Appeals. Thus the present standard of what constitutes in-
decent or immoral behavior between consenting "adults" in Twentieth
century Kentucky may still be a matter of conjecture; whereas the
standards of what constitutes sodomy under KRS § 436.050 seem to be
generally those of nineteenth century English common law.
7
Consequently, if a case should arise as to the meaning of KRS §
435.105(2), it would be possible for the Court of Appeals to follow
Rittenour v. District of Columbia,8 in which the Municipal Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia interpreted a similar statute9 as
not applying to private consensual homosexual behavior. The view
of that court was that ". . . [A] lthough an open or public act in the
common law sense is no longer required, it is our opinion that the
present law was not designed nor intended to apply to an act com-
mitted in privacy in the presence of a single and consenting person."'10
The Rittenour opinion is in keeping with the comment to the
proposal of the American Law Institute which states: "[N] o harm to
the secular interests of the community is involved in atypical sex
practice in private between consenting adult partners. This area of
private morals is the distinctive concern of spiritual authorities."" As
a result of this thinking, Section 213.2 of the Model Penal Code pro-
hibits deviate sexual intercourse, only when that intercourse is ac-
complished through force, involves the adult corruption of a minor,
or is accompanied by a public offense.
12
7 See discussion in note 4 supra.
8 163 A.2d 558 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1960).
9 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1112(a) (Supp. VIII 1960).
10 163 A.2d at 559.
11 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).1 2 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Ofcial Draft 1962). The following are rele-
vant sections of the statute:
Deviate Sexual Intercourse by Force or Imposition.
(1) By Force or Its Equivalent.. A person who engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another person, or who causes another to engage in
deviate sexual intercourse, commits a felony of the second degree if:
(a) he compels the other person to participate by force or by threat
of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kid-
napping, to be inflicted on anyone; or
(b) hephas substantially impaired the other person's power to ap-
praise or control his conduct, by administering or employing
Without the knowledge of the other person drugs, intoxicants or
other means for the purpose of preventing resistance; or
c) the other person is unconscious; or
d) the other person is less than 10 years old.
Deviate sexual intercourse means sexual intercourse per os or per
anum between beings who are not husband and wife, and any form of
sexual intercourse with an animal.
(2) By Other Imposition. A person who engages in deviate sexual inter-
(Continued on next page)
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The Model Penal Code defines deviate intercourse as "sexual inter-
course per os or per anum between human beings who are not hus-
band and wife, and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal."13
Illinois simplifies its definition by considering sexually deviate conduct
as only "sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another."14 New York, on the other hand,
evidently considers deviate sexual intercourse as self-defining.'9 Illinois
remains the only state to have adopted the Model Penal Codes
rationale of considering sexually deviate behavior by consenting adults
not to be a criminal offense.16 New York still considers such behavior
a crime but punishes that behavior with only a ninety day maximum
jail sentence.' The New York prohibition is probably a political con-
sideration, but it also reflects a desire that the criminal law should
not condone sexually deviate behavior and thus such behavior must
be prohibited. 18 This logic is well within the ethical conceptual frame-
work of our Judeo-Christian culture. 19 Yet it is quite obvious that pro-
hibitions of private sexual deviation can only be enforced, if at all,
by the stationing of a policeman in every private place. The col-
lective moral judgment of society as to what constitutes normal sexual
conduct is frustrated unless society is willing to tear down the walls of
privacy in order to enforce its collective morality.20
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
course with another person, or who causes another to engage in
deviate sexual intercourse, commits a felony of the third degree if:
(a) he compels the other person to participate by any threat that
would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution; or
(b) he knows that the other person suffers from a mental disease
or defect which renders him incapable of appraising the nature
of his conduct; or
(c) he knows that the other person submits because he is unaware
that a sexual act is being committed upon him.'3 Id.
14 ILL. Canm. CODE § 11-2 (1962).
15 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 Practice Commentary (McKinney 1967).
16 ILL. CBMIu CODE § 11-3 (196); see also MicHr. REV. CPam. CODE § 2317
(Final Draft Sept. 1967).
17 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.38 (McKinney 1967).
18 A similar view is expressed by Mr. James Adair, a committee member, in
his reservation to the report of the GREAT BRITAN CoIMmTrEE ON HoMosExuAL
OFFENSES A ND PROSTrUTION 117-23 (Rep. No. 79, 1957) [hereinafter cited as the
WOLFENDEN REPORT].
19 'Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind." Leviticus 18:22.
See generally, W. CHUaCFmLL, HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MAIM (1967);
see also, 48 AM. JuR. Sodomy §§ 1-7 (1943).20 The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Studu of
Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 643, 686-
742, 795-97 (1966). This study shows that most arrests of homosexuals were
made by vice squad decoys. See also Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251
(9th Cir. 1965), which involved the apprehension of homosexuals through the
use of a peep hole in a "public" toilet. See generally D. WEST, HomosExuxrrr
89-91 (1967).
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Would it not be better for the state to refrain from attempting to
regulate personal automony and instead hold a person responsible for
his actions only when those actions directly interfere with the well
being of the community?21 But perhaps this question is made moot in
light of Griswold v. Connecticut.22 The "zone of privacy" as established
in that case to protect from criminal sanctions the right of married
couples to use contraceptives in their private sexual lives can easily
be expanded to protect the right of homosexuals to engage in private
consensual relationship. 23 The possibilty of such an expansion, how-
ever, is made remote by the fact that homosexuals who act discretely
and carry on only private consensual relationships are basically im-
mune from prosecution because consenting partners are naturally
undesirous of swearing out complaints against themselves.24 It would
thus appear then that the Supreme Court will not have an opportunity
to enact judicial legislation in the field of private consensual deviate
sexuality within the near future.24 Consequently, any change in the
law concerning the regulation of homosexual behavior will probably
come about either through local judicial interpretation or through
state legislative enactment.
If the laws attempting to regulate homosexual behavior are to be
changed, this change must be based on an enforceable value judgment
which is rationally attained on the basis of known facts. It is thus
essential that we recognize the wide variance of homosexual behavior.
Dr. Stanley Willis25 states:
Homosexual behavior can range from an extremely bizarre form of
psychopathological acting-out to a highly integrated act of love between
two stable and mature people. It can be a manifestation of many dif-
ferent emotional states, some of which are isolated, sporadic, non-
recurring responses to changing psychodynamic forces, or it can represent
a fixed adjustment pattern. The meaning of any homosexual behavior will
depend on the particular persons and the circumstances in which the act
21 See W. Lwpmq, A PREFAcE TO MonAMs 286 (1929). Mr. Lippman
states: ". . .[W]hat everybody must know is that sexual conduct, whatever it may
be, is regulated personally and not publicly in modem society."
22381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23 In striking down a Connecticut statute which made it a criminal offense for
persons to use any drug, article or instrument for preventing conception, justice
Douglas said: "The present case ... concerns a relationship lying within the zone
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees [namely the
penumbras of Amendments I, III, IV, V and IX of the U.S. Constitution]." Id. at
485.
24 D. VEsr, supra note 20, at 84.2 5Adjunct Professor of Law in Forensic Psychiatry, University of San Diego
School of Law; Sometime Lecturer, Neuropsychiatric Institute, School of Medi-
cine, University of California at Los Angeles; Private Practice of Psychiatry, La
Jolla, California.
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takes place. To lump all homosexual activity into one category is a naive
but serious mistake.
26
Once we realize that homosexual behavior can be diverse and
variable, we can then make proposals for the regulation of those types
of homosexual behavior which we believe to be not only worthy of
control but also susceptible to control. As we have seen, the Model
Penal Code advises the regulation of only certain types of homosexual
behavior.2 7 In support of these provisions it is argued that under our
present statutes, or under a statute like New York's 28 which specifically
includes a prohibition against consensual deviate behavior, the only
person to really gain is the blackmailer. 29 Yet, it would seem that even
if the law was changed so as to conform to the Model Penal Code,
the blackmailer would still have the power of exposure within the
social framework of the community. True, exposure would not put the
homosexual in jail, but it is more than likely that he would still lose
his social position and his means of employment.30 It is also argued, as
many medical experts conclude, that homosexuality is symptomatic
of psychological disorder, stemming from a failure to achieve mature
psychic development, and that it cannot be cured unless the underlying
psychological deviation is cured."3 1 Yet when this position is discussed
in light of cultural and medical history, it seems absurd. Are we to
conclude that all of the ancient Greeks, Romans and Egyptians who
26 S. WILLIS, UNDERSTANDING AND COUNSELING THE MAr HomosxxuAL 6
(1967). See also D. CAPPoN, TowAim AN UNDERSTANDING OF HomosExuALrry
(1965). Dr. Cappon states:
... [T]here is no such thing as 'a homosexual.' The H person may be a
he or a she; black, pink, or yellow; an Italian, a Jew, or one of the Her-
renvolk. He may be effeminnate and handsome, or she may be masculine
and ugly; he may be robust and athletic, or she may be very feminine.
An H person may be exclusively homosexual in behavior; have inter-
course with both sexes at different times, or even roughly at the same
time; or not have any sexual relations with a human being at all. The
personalities of H persons may be variable or prototypic as the person-
ality of humans in general. Hence the deliberate avoidance of the sub-
stantive 'homosexual' in the title of this book and in the subsequent
exposition. The moral and scientific error of classifying man in necessarily
false or inadequate categories usually leads to rejection and condemnation.
('He is a neurotic,' or, 'She is a psychopath,' e.g.) Id. at 4.2 7 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Official Draft 1962).
2 8 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 130.38 (McKinney 1967).
29 See E. Scam, Cnmms WIrHoUT Vicrvis 82-85 (1965). See also S.
WILLIS, supra note 26, at 25.3
0 Homosexuals are often unnoticed members of a respectable community
with ordinary jobs and otherwise ordinary lives. See generally M. Ho rn ,N, THE
GAY WORLD (1968).
31 See George, Legal, Medical-and-Psychiatric Considerations in the Control
of Prostitution, 60 Micr. L. REv. 717, 753-57 (1962); SExUAL BEHAVIOR AND
LAw 434-77 (Slovenko ed. 1964).
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participated in homosexual activities in cultures whose norms were
not adverse to such behavior, were suffering from a psychological dis-
order?32 Even today in American society, which outwardly disdains
homosexual activity, Kinsey reports that "37 per cent of the total male
population has at least some overt homosexual experience to the point
of orgasm between adolescence and old age."
33
Professor Ploscowe states:
Female homosexuality has been studied much less intensely than male
homosexuality, but it too is far more widespread than is generally
realized. Katherine B. Davis studied twelve hundred unmarried college
graduates who averaged thirty-seven years of age. Of this number half
had experienced intense emotional relations with other women and over
three hundred, or one-fourth of the total reported sexual activities with
other women. Of one hundred married women studied by Hamilton, one-
fourth admitted homosexual physical episodes.3 4
Is then one-third of our population, because it has had some homo-
sexual experience, suffering from a psychological disorder? The
psychodynamics of homosexual behavior are poorly understood. Most
writers treat this behavior "as if it were a static condition with a
single underlying psychological cause."3 5 Consequently, the results of
these studies are inconclusive.36 However, it is known that homosexual
interests "are not only possible in 'normal' men, but are also actually
present in some form during some phases of the development of any
personality."3 7 We also know that homosexual behavior is diverse,
fluid and not easily categorized, but is subject in all forms to attempted
regulation by our criminal law.
We are well aware that there are "heterosexuals" as well as "homo-
sexuals" who are pathologically inclined to criminal conduct and are
rightfully under the purview of our criminal law. But the criminal law
is still trying to regulate private "abnormal" heterosexual activities as
well as private consensual homosexual behavior. As we have seen,
the attempted regulation of private morality is in vain. Homosexual as
well as heterosexual deviates are still with us, even though their
methods of sexual gratification do not lead to propagation. "Homo-
32 See W. CHuucurr.L, supra note 19, at 15-35; D. WEST, supra note 20, at
17-34-73.33 A. KNSEY, W. PoMmoY & C. MATIN, SE UAL BEHvAVO IN Tm : HuMr
MALE Figure 156 (1948).
34 M. PLoscowE, SEX AND THE LA W 204-06 (1951).
35 See S. Wm.Ls, supra note 26, at 84.
30 Id. at 83-109; see also D. CAPPoN, supra note 26, at 67-111. Compare
DE SAVrrSCH, HomosExALrrry, TnANSVESTmSM, m CHANGE. OF SEX 1, 16 (1958),
with E. BEnGLERa, HoMosExuALrry: DISEASE OR WAY OF LIFE? 31 (1956).
ar S. Wmrws, supra note 26, at 108.
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sexuals" remain a significant segment of our population.38 We make
them criminals who have no victims.3 9
This writer knows of no public opinion poll taken in Kentucky
reflecting public sentiment as to the matter of reforming the laws
which attempt to regulate homosexual behavior. Perhaps then it is of
some value to the legislature to know that in a recent Australian poll,
twenty-two percent of the Australians polled favored the liberalization
of their laws (which are much like Kentucky's) pertaining to the
regulation of homosexual behavior. 40 If we hypothesize that Ken-
tuckians are not any more receptive to the liberalization of such laws,
one can only conclude that the possibility of reform in this area of the
criminal law is politically unfeasible. If, however, this hypothesis is
incorrect,41 or in the alternative, if reason, knowledge and sanity
prevail, then perhaps the Kentucky legislature will enact section 213.2
of the Model Penal Code,42 thereby making Kentucky's criminal
sanctions applicable only to those whose sexual deviation is ac-
companied by force, the adult corruption of a minor, or a public
offense.
Paul L. Lamb
CRmmIAL LAw-OFImALk MiscoNDucr-TDE NEED FOR LEGLA-
TIVE REFoBM.-Official misconduct may be defined as any unlawful be-
havior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful
or corrupt failure, refusal, or neglect by an officer to perform any duty
imposed on him by law.' It differs from bribery in that in official mis-
conduct the officer need not receive any bribe or derive any personal
benefit from the corrupt act.
2
At present Kentucky has no specific statute covering official mis-
conduct. Various sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes [herein-
after referred to as KRS] prohibit certain activities of specific
as See THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 17-47.
39 This paraphrase is borrowed from E. Scma, CRmES WrrmouT Vicrmis
(1965).
40 Chappell & Wilson, Public Attitudes to the Reform of the Law Relating to
Abortion and Homosexuality, 42 AuST. L.J. 175, 178 (1968).4
1 Education had a strong influence on the results of the poll; e.g., forty-
eight percent of those with college training favored the liberalization of the laws
regarding homosexual behavior whereas only sixteen percent of the laborers and
unskilled workers favored such reform. Id. at 179.4 2 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Official Draft 1962). The provisions of this
section are set out in full in note 12 supra.
1 BLAcK's LAw DiCr1ONA Y 1236 (4th ed. 1951).
2 11 C.J.S. Bribery § 1 (1938).
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